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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of an increase in life expectancy on the level
and the distribution of income in the presence of skill heterogeneity and automa-
tion capital. It shows analytically that an increase in life expectancy induces the
replacement of low-skilled workers by automation capital and high-skilled workers.
It also raises the skill premium, but has an ambiguous e¤ect on total income. When
we perform a simulation exercise, based on US data, we nd that an increase in life
expectancy raises the level of income but exacerbates its distribution. For this rea-
son, we also examine redistributive policies that can mitigate some of the negative
e¤ects that follow an increase in life expectancy.
JEL Classication: J11, J24, J64, O33
Keywords: Life Expectancy, Automation, Search and Matching, Skill Heterogeneity
1 Introduction
A specter is haunting the developed world - the specter of automation. The steady growth
of automation capital, such as robots, control systems and 3D-printers is ubiquitous in
every developed country. It is estimated that the number of industrial robots in operation
globally was around 1.8 million at the end of 2016, rose to over 2.4 million at the end of
2018 and is expected to approach 4.5 million by the end of 2022 (our calculations based
on data in IFR 2019a). Moreover, roughly 168,000 professional service robots were sold
globally in 2017 and this gure is expected to reach over 2.8 million in the period between
2018 and 2022 (IFR 2019b). The fear is then that automation capital will replace labor,
especially the low-skilled one, thereby leading to high rates of technological unemploy-
ment and a worsening of wage inequality, a situation often referred to as automation
anxiety (see Prettner and Bloom 2020, pp. xi and xii).
A related phenomenon, as we argue below, is population aging, which has become a
global phenomenon. Over the past several decades, most economies have experienced a
substantial increase in life expectancy. According to the United Nations, in 2019 there
were 703 million older persons aged 65 years or over, who comprised 9 percent of the world
population. In particular, Europe and Northern America have the most aged population,
with 18 percent being over 65 years.1 Population aging results in an increase in the
dependency ratio - the ratio of those not of working age to those of working age - lowers
per capita income and puts pressure on productive population. To overcome these adverse
e¤ects and increase their productivity, it is often argued that economies must rely not
only on traditional capital deepening but also on robots and automation, which, as we
mention above, may a¤ect negatively the distribution of income. Still, we claim that the
connection between longevity and automation is even deeper.
Automation and robotics are elds of articial intelligence (AI).2 While AI and robots,
in particular, emerged in large-scale mass manufacturing, they are now spreading to more
and more application areas.3 One of them is Healthcare Informatics, which seems to
be advancing in great leaps and bounds. For example, new technology, such as AI-
powered Digital Workers, reduces signicantly the cost of collecting, sorting and analyzing
data that are important for the development and approval of new medicines. Thus, the
pharmaceutical companies are in a position to bring new and better drugs to the market
1The advanced economies are not the only ones facing rapid population aging. Some emerging
economies follow closely a similar transformation. For example, in China, the share of the population
aged 65 years or over has continuously increased in recent years and reached 11.9 percent in 2019.
2The economic use of AI can be divided into ve categories: Deep Learning, Robotization, Demateri-
alization, Gig economy, and Autonomous Driving (see Wisskirchen et al. 2017)
3The rst industrial robot was installed in a General Motors automobile factory in New Jersey (Bryn-
jolfsson and McAfee 2016).
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faster. Moreover, using AI-powered tools such as DAC [Deep Aging Clocks], doctors
should be able to track the changes that occur every second in patients bodies over
their lifetime; hence, they should be able to assess more precisely individual health risks
and design appropriate interventions and changes in lifestyle for each specic patient.
Longevity medicine, a new branch of medicine, is specically focused on promoting
healthspan and lifespan, and is powered by AI technology (Zhavoronkov et al. 2021, p.
6).4
At the same time, an increase in longevity has a positive e¤ect on saving (see, for ex-
ample, Bloom et al. 2003, Zhang and Zhang 2005, Kinugasa and Mason 2007 and Li et al.
2007). It is then natural to expect that part of this saving is invested in new technologies.5
Hence, automation and population aging are not only synchronous phenomena, but they
also reinforce each other. Research in AI, which includes automation, nds applications
in medicine and raises human longevity, while longevity increases saving and investment
in AI. In fact, whereas, in the past, part of the increase in longevity was driven by im-
provements in sanitation, housing and education, in addition to vaccines and antibiotics, a
further increase would have to rely almost entirely on technological advancements. Hence,
the link between longevity and AI will become even stronger.6
This paper analyzes the distributional e¤ects of a change in life expectancy. Specif-
ically, it examines the interplay between longevity and automation capital within an
otherwise standard overlapping generations model that allows for labor market frictions
and skill heterogeneity. We capture the increase in longevity parametrically and show
how it leads to higher saving and investment in automation. Within such a framework,
then, we show analytically that an increase in life expectancy induces the replacement of
low-skilled workers by automation capital and high-skilled workers. It also raises the skill
premium, but has an ambiguous e¤ect on total income. When we calibrate the model to
the US data, we nd that an increase in life expectancy raises the level of income but
exacerbates its distribution. We also extend the baseline model and allow for di¤eren-
tial longevity between low- and high-skilled workers as well as for endogenous education
and thus occupational attainment. Finally, we propose redistributive policies that can
mitigate and in some cases even reverse the aforementioned adverse e¤ects.
4Other important applications of AI in health include deep learning to diagnose diseases, medical
robots, and AI-powered radiology assistant, to name but a few.
5Indeed, Gehringer and Prettner (2019) using data from the OECD nd a remarkably robust positive
relation between decreasing mortality and technological progress.
6Recent empirical studies that examine the relation between demographics and automation include
Abeliansky and Prettner (2017) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018). The rst study nds that an increase
in population growth is associated with a reduction in the growth rate of automation density. The second
study documents that countries that undergo faster aging - measured by an increase in the ratio of older
to middle-aged workers - invest more in robots.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next subsection reviews some
of the related literature. Section 2 presents the basic model and Section 3 analyzes its
steady-state equilibrium. Section 4 calibrates the model to the US data and assesses
quantitatively the e¤ects of an increase in agents life expectancy/longevity. Moreover,
using the calibrated model, the same section assesses the implications of a redistributive
policy that provides a subsidy to rms for maintaining low-skilled vacancies and nances
it with a robot tax. Section 5 extends rst the basic model to allow for a) di¤erent mor-
tality rates between low- and high-skilled workers and b) endogenous education decision.
Then, it evaluates a second redistributive policy, namely, one that levies again a robot
tax and uses the proceeds to subsidize the acquisition of human capital. Finally, Section
6 summarizes the main results and suggests some avenues for future research.
1.1 Related Literature
This section outlines the contribution of the paper with respect to the relevant literature.
Several important papers have examined the e¤ects of an increase in longevity on saving
and economic growth; e.g., Zhang et al. (2001), Zhang and Zhang (2005), Cipriani (2014),
Baldanzi et al. (2019). However, much of the existing research pays little attention to
the impact of longevity on labor market outcomes. Two notable exceptions include de la
Croix et al. (2013) and Friese (2016). Nevertheless, since these studies do not allow for
skill heterogeneity, they are not designed to analyze any distributional e¤ects. Moreover,
most of the previous studies, when analyzing the e¤ects of longevity, do not take into
account the importance of automation capital, a factor that is highly substitutable for
unskilled labor.
Our paper is closely related to the recent literature that studies the e¤ects of automa-
tion. In fact, our analysis of life expectancy within an automation-augmented search and
matching framework brings together two previously disconnected lines of research, consist-
ing of Abeliansky and Prettner (2017), Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) and Stähler (2021),
on the one hand, and Cords and Prettner (2019), Guimarães and Gil (2019), Lankisch
et al. (2019) and Gasteiger and Prettner (2020), on the other. As mentioned above (see
footnote 6), the papers by Abeliansky and Prettner (2017) and Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2018) show theoretically and document empirically that aging leads to greater automa-
tion. The rst paper captures aging by a decrease in the population growth rate, whereas
the second paper measures it as an increase in the ratio of older to middle-aged work-
ers. The paper by Stähler (2021) analyzes a life-cycle model in which the representative
rm produces a nal good using four factors: routine and non-routine labor, traditional
and automation capital. It shows that the positive e¤ect of technological progress on
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per capita output outweighs the negative e¤ect of population aging; this, however, comes
at the cost of increased inequality. We do not consider technological progress and focus
instead on changes in the skill premium, the (un)employment rates and the distribution
of income. We also allow for di¤erent survival probabilities across skill groups as well as
for endogenous education decision. Finally, we analyze the role of policy in mitigating the
adverse distributional e¤ects.
Cords and Prettner (2019) develop a model with automation and a rich search and
matching environment. The production side of their model is almost identical to the
one that we use in this paper, namely, the aggregate production technology combines
skilled and unskilled labor with physical and automation capital. Automation capital,
in particular, is a perfect substitute for unskilled labor and an imperfect substitute for
skilled labor. Within such a framework, they study how changes in automation capital
a¤ect the unemployment and wages of the two types of labor. When they calibrate their
model to German data they nd that the job creation of automation outweighs the job
destruction and thus overall employment increases. Although our paper shares several
common characteristics with the one by Cords and Prettner (2019), there are also several
important di¤erences between the two papers. For example, our research question is
di¤erent in that we ask how a change in longevity a¤ects labor market outcomes and
especially income inequality. Moreover, the answer to this question depends crucially on
our use of an overlapping generations model where agents save for the old days, whereas
Cords and Prettner use an innite horizon Mortensen-Pissarides type model where agents
are risk neutral.
Guimarães and Gil (2019) develop a search and matching model in which rms choose
between two di¤erent technologies, an automated and a manual-labor. They show that an
automation-augmenting shock, i.e., an increase in the productivity of automation capital,
increases the average wage and employment, but reduces the labor share in total income.
Their model also suggests that the observed decline in the US labor share is mainly at-
tributed to technological shocks, with institutional shocks playing an almost insignicant
role. Thus, their focus is on the e¤ect of automation capital on the labor share and not
on changes in longevity or income inequality.
Lankisch et al. (2019) is another important paper in this literature. They simplify
the household side of the economy by assuming a constant saving rate à la Solow and
emphasize the production side by using a technology with four factors as in Cords and
Prettner (2019), described above. They show the possibility of a balanced growth path
with a positive growth rate of per capita output despite the absence of technical progress.
Furthermore, they nd that automation decreases the real wages of low-skilled workers
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and increases the skill premium. Our paper di¤ers from theirs since i) it uses an over-
lapping generations model with endogenous saving behavior and varying lifetime and ii)
it includes, as part of the economic environment, search frictions that create involuntary
unemployment. Moreover, Lankisch et al. (2019) conclude their paper with a central
policy implication of their model, namely, to invest in higher education. They write that
such an education policy could dampen the e¤ect of automation on wage inequality.
We explore in detail this policy recommendation.
Methodologically, Gasteiger and Prettner (2020) is also closely related to our work
even though it has a di¤erent focus. They show that the implications of automation for
long-run growth in an overlapping generations model are di¤erent from those in a Cass-
Koopmans or in a Solow model. In an overlapping generations model with automation,
the economy converges to a steady-state with zero growth in per capita output, even when
labor is fully replaced by automation capital and thus the production function becomes of
the AK form. The reason is that, in the overlapping generations framework, households
save and invest exclusively out of their rst-period labor income, which diminishes with
automation and eventually becomes a negligible fraction of the stock of automated capital;
hence, accumulation ceases to take place.
Finally, an important recent contribution regarding the taxation of robots is Guerreiro
et al. (2021). They develop an overlapping generations framework with endogenous
skill acquisition and labor supply. Robots are better substitutes for routine than for
non-routine labor. Moreover, the cost of producing robots falls over time as a result of
technical progress. Within this framework, they solve for the optimal Mirrleesian tax
structure under perfect commitment. We are not concerned with optimal taxation issues.
Instead, we focus on how a change in longevity a¤ects labor market outcomes. Also, in
our investigation of the role of policy in mitigating the adverse distributional e¤ects of an
increase in longevity, we take the tax on automation capital as given.
In sum, our paper shares common ingredients with several of the above-mentioned
papers. We cast our model within an overlapping generations framework, as in Gasteiger
and Prettner (2020), because of the convenience that it provides in modelling changes
in life expectancy/longevity and the motive to save for the old days. Also, we introduce
automation capital as a highly substitutable factor for unskilled labor, which is a common
characteristic of most papers in the literature. Hence, changes in the quantity of automa-
tion capital lead to changes in the demand for unskilled labor (availability of unskilled
jobs). This ingredient coupled with search and matching frictions, also found in Cords and
Prettner (2019) and Guimarães and Gil (2019), a¤ects the rate of unemployment among
unskilled workers, as a result of the way that rms react to market conditions (changes
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in market tightness). The position then of unskilled labor is a¤ected not only by changes
in its price but also by changes in its quantity employed. Finally, we distinguish between
two groups, skilled and unskilled workers, as in Cords and Prettner (2019) and Lankisch
et al. (2019), so that we can analyze changes in the skill premium and the distribution of
income.
Our main contribution to the literature is that we study the e¤ects of longevity, which
has been consistently increasing for most societal groups and in most developed countries.
We argue that this increase in longevity is consistent and in fact contributes to some of
the changes that we observe in the labor markets, namely, an increasing skill premium,
declined real wages and replacement of the low-skilled workers by automation capital and
a rising income inequality.7 Finally, we propose policies that can mitigate and in some
cases even reverse the adverse distributional e¤ects of an increase in longevity.
2 The Model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy inhabited by an innite sequence of large
households whose members have the potential lifetime of two periods. More specically,
the individual members of each household live with certainty during the period following
their birth, but they may or may not survive to their second and last period of life.
We assume that, before their survival prospect is realized, each agent gives birth to one
o¤spring.
All agents belong to a household and all members of a household are a priori identical.
There are two types of household: one whose members are all high-skilled (h) and another
whose members are all low-skilled (l). We use the index i 2 fh; lg, either as a subscript
or as a superscript, to denote the skill level. We normalize the numbers of representative
high- and low-skilled households to nh and nl, so that nl = 1   nh. Moreover, we also
normalize the size of each type of household to 1. We let  2 [0; 1] denote the probability
that a young agent survives to maturity; consequently, 1    is the probability that the
agent dies prematurely.
During youth, agents search for employment. If they are successful in nding a match
with a rm, they work (the time endowment is 1) and receive labor income. If, on the
other hand, individuals cannot nd a job, they remain unemployed. In the second period
of their life, even if agents survive, nature does not bestow on them the ability to work.
Thus, as a result of frictions in the labor market, individuals face uncertainty in income.
7For a summary of the stylized facts regarding the skill premium, wages, employment rates and
inequality see Lankisch et al. (2019) and Prettner and Bloom (2020).
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We follow the large household assumption (see, for example, Lucas 1990), and assume
that all members in the same household pool their income together in both periods of life.
2.1 Households
Each household i seeks to maximize the average utility of its members:
U it = log c
i
y;t +  log c
i
o;t+1;
where ciy;t and c
i
o;t+1 denote consumption in the young and in the old age, respectively,
 > 0 is the discount factor and, as mentioned before,  is the probability that a young
agent survives to maturity.8 The households problem is to choose fciy;t; c
i
o;t+1g and saving












where eit is the proportion of household members that are employed, w
i
t is the wage for
workers with skill i, and rt+1 is the (common) interest rate.
9 Solving the maximization
problem outlined above yields the expressions:
cio;t+1
ciy;t







It follows from equation (4) that an increase in the probability of survival to the second
period of life, , and hence an increase in longevity; has a positive e¤ect on households
saving. As mentioned in the Introduction, this nding receives strong empirical support.10
8This is a common way of introducing the survival probability in overlapping generations models, see,
for example, Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Chakraborty (2004), Cipriani (2014), Palivos and Varvarigos
(2017) and Baltanzi et al. (2019).
9To simplify our analysis, we do not consider taxation and unemployment benets.
10The logarithmic utility function that we use results in great analytical tractability; however, it yields
a constant saving rate, =(1+ ) (the income and substitution e¤ect of an increase in the interest rate
o¤set each other). Thus, one cannot distinguish the e¤ect of an increase in patience, as captured by an
increase in ; from the e¤ect of an increase in longevity, as captured by an increase in ; on saving. On the
contrary, the two parameters have an opposite e¤ect on future consumption cio;t+1: Whereas an increase
in  raises cio;t+1; because the future matters more, an increase in  lowers it, because the opportunity
cost of future consumption (= =(1 + rt+1) increases.
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2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of identical rms. Each period t, the representative rm employs
low-skilled labor, lt, high-skilled labor, ht, traditional physical capital, kt, and automation
capital, pt, e.g., robots, control systems and other appliances with a minimal direct human
operation, to produce output, yt: More specically, we postulate that the production




t [(lt + pt)
 + (1  )ht ]
1  
 ; (5)
where A > 0 is a productivity parameter,  2 (0; 1) governs capital income share,  2
(0; 1) governs labor income shares,  < 1 determines the elasticity of substitution between
low- and high-skilled labor and  > 0 measures the productivity of automation capital
relative to unskilled labor. Accordingly, as it is common in this literature, e.g., Prettner
(2019) and Gasteiger and Prettner (2020), automation capital is assumed to be a perfect
substitute for unskilled labor (at the rate ) and an imperfect substitute for skilled labor.
Henceforth, we restrict our attention to the empirically relevant case where low- and
high-skilled labor are gross substitutes for each other, i.e.,  > 0 and the elasticity of
substitution 1=(1   ) > 1 (see, for example, Ottaviano and Peri 2012). This is also the
case analyzed in the recent literature (see Cords and Prettner 2019 and Lankisch et al.
2019).
The marginal products of low- and high-skilled labor are given by
yl;t = Ak
 
t [(lt + pt)
 + (1  )ht ]
1  





t [(lt + pt)
 + (1  )ht ]
1  

 1 (1   ) (1  )h 1t ; (7)
while the marginal product of traditional physical capital is
yk;t =  Ak
  1
t [(lt + pt)
 + (1  )ht ]
1  
 (8)
and that of automation capital yp;t = yl;t:
A rm opens a job vacancy of type i and searches for a suitable worker in the labor
market. There is a cost di > 0 for maintaining a vacancy (a recruitment cost). Hence,
the representative rms prot ow, t, is equal to the output produced net of the cost
of employing low- and high-skilled labor, the cost of renting traditional physical and
automation capital, and the cost of maintaining vacancies:
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where vit denotes vacancies of type i, and Rk;t and Rp;t denote, respectively, the gross rate
paid to traditional physical capital and to automation capital. The demands for low- and








t ; where q
i
t is the vacancy matching
rate in labor market i, that is, the probability that a vacancy of type i will be lled.




t . The rst-order conditions
for prot maximization are
yk;t = Rk;t; (9)














t = dh: (12)
Equations (9) and (10) state that, at the optimum, the marginal products of traditional
and automation capital equal their respective marginal cost. Equations (11) and (12), on
the other hand, equate the expected marginal benet from lling a vacancy of type i to
its marginal cost di.
In addition, there is a no-arbitrage condition, which states that investing in traditional
physical capital or in automation capital yields the same rate of return, i.e., Rk;t = Rp;t;




 (lt + pt)
 + (1  )ht
(lt + pt) 1
: (13)
For simplicity, we assume that traditional and automation capital are fully depreciated
within a period. As a result, Rj;t = 1 + rt; where j 2 fk; pg.
2.3 Job Matching
Each labor market exhibits search and matching frictions. We assume pair-wise random
matching. Moreover, vacancies match with workers of the same type, i.e., there is no
cross-skill matching. All newly born individuals are initially unemployed and, thus, the
total measure of job-seekers of type i at the beginning of every period is ni. The measure
9




















where i > 0 measures the degree of matching e¢ciency and  2 (0; 1) denotes the
elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies.
Dene the tightness in labor market i as it = v
i
t=ni: The job nding rate, i.e., the































The wage rate wit is determined through cooperative Nash bargaining. Workers and rms
have relative bargaining power  and 1   , respectively, where  2 (0; 1). For a rm,
hiring an additional worker will create a surplus of yi;t   w
i
t. On the other hand, for a
household, accepting a job o¤er will raise its objective function by @U it=@e
i
t. The outcome

















wit = yi;t; (18)
i.e., workers receive a fraction of their marginal product, which is equal to their bargaining
power :
3 Equilibrium Analysis: The E¤ects of an Increase
in Life Expectancy













fh; lg and j 2 fk; pg; such that in every period t: (a) given the factor price sequence
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discounted lifetime utility; (b) given fwit; Rj;tg ; the vacancy and investment decisions
fvit; kt; ptg maximize rms prots; (c) the measures of low- and high-skilled employed
workers are given by equations (14) and (15); (d) the wage in each market is given by equa-
tion (18); (e) the no-arbitrage condition Rk;t = Rp;t holds; (f) the interest rate rt = Rj;t 1;





Using equations (4), (11), (12) and (18) and imposing steady-state conditions, we can































where yl; yh; k; l; and h are given by equations (6), (7), (13), (14) and (15).
Proposition 1 An increase in life expectancy, i.e., an increase in ; results in: (a) a
positive e¤ect on the steady-state level of traditional and automation capital, the employ-
ment and wage of high-skilled workers and the skill premium; (b) a negative e¤ect on the
employment and wage of low-skilled workers; and (c) an ambiguous e¤ect on output.
Proof : See the Appendix.
Consider rst the e¤ect of an increase in , which corresponds to an increase in life
expectancy or equivalently in longevity, on traditional and automation capital. The right-
hand side of equation (19), which captures households saving, goes up. Intuitively, an
increase in the probability of surviving to retirement motivates individuals to save more
for old-age consumption. More saving then translates into higher levels of traditional and
automation capital, since besides factors of production, they are also assets (stores of
value). Second, it follows from equation (7) that the increase in traditional or automation
capital raises the marginal product of high-skilled labor, which, in turn, raises rms
demand for high-skilled labor and increases the wage of high-skilled workers (equation 18).
On the contrary, from equation (6), the e¤ects of an increase in traditional and automation
capital on variables that are related to low-skilled labor work in opposite directions. In
particular, on the one hand, an increase in automation capital reduces the marginal
product of low-skilled workers, which decreases rms demand for low-skilled labor and
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lowers the wage of low-skilled workers (see equation 18). On the other hand, an increase
in traditional physical capital raises the marginal product of low-skilled workers. As a
result, the employment and the wage of low-skilled workers tend to increase. Nevertheless,
the former e¤ect, which operates through automation capital, dominates the latter one,
which operates via traditional capital. Therefore, an increase in life expectancy has a
negative e¤ect on the employment level and the wage of low-skilled workers. Next, the
increase in wh and the drop in wl result in an increase in the skill premium, dened as
wh=wl. Finally, the e¤ect of an increase in life expectancy on output is ambiguous. This
is so because, on the one hand, the employment of low-skilled workers goes down, but,
on the other hand, the level of traditional physical capital, automation capital and the
employment of high-skilled workers go up.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to the US data and obtain quantitative results
regarding the e¤ects of an increase in life expectancy/longevity. We are primarily inter-
ested in the e¤ects of an increase in life expectancy on output, automation capital, wages,
employment of skilled and unskilled labor, skill premium and income distribution.
4.1 Calibration
There are 14 parameters in the model: the discount factor , the elasticity of the matching
function with respect to the measure of vacancies , the matching e¢ciency parameters
h and l; the workers bargaining power , the capital income share  , the share of high-
skilled labor force nh, the vacancy costs dh and dl, the production parameters A,  and ,
the probability of survival to the old age , and the relative productivity of automation
capital . One period in our model lasts for 30 years.
First, we use the annual discount factor of 0:98; which implies  = 0:545. Second,
following common practice, we set  =  = 0:5; and  = 0:3. Third, following, among
others, Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) and Prettner and Strulik (2020), we dene as
skilled a worker with at least a Bachelors degree and set the percentage of skilled workers
nh equal to 0:323. Fourth, based on Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020), we use the value of
 = 3.11 Fifth,  is set equal to 0:6, so that the life expectancy obtained is consistent with
that in the data (78 years). Finally, based on the estimates of Ottaviano and Peri (2012),
we set the production parameter  equal to 0:5, implying an elasticity of substitution
11Nevertheless, our results are robust to lower values of :
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between high- and low-skilled labor equal to 2:0.12
The remaining parameters are jointly calibrated to match the following 6 targets ob-
tained from the US data: a) the average employment rates of workers with at least a
Bachelors degree (skilled labor) and of workers with less than a Bachelors degree (un-
skilled labor) equal 0:976 and 0:939, respectively; b) the skill premium is 1:97; c) the
vacancy to unemployment ratios equal 0:620; d) the robots to labor ratio is 2%. The
values of the calibrated parameters are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Values of the Calibrated Parameters
Value Interpretation
 = 0:427 Labor income share parameter
A = 6:830 Production e¢ciency parameter
l = 1:203, h = 1:240 Matching e¢ciency parameters
dl = 0:975; dh = 1:979 Vacancy costs
4.2 Results
To assess the e¤ects of longevity we perform a simulation exercise. More specically, we
let  increase gradually from its baseline value 0:6 (life expectancy = 78 years) to 0:9
(life expectancy = 87 years). The results regarding the level of automation capital (p),
the employment levels (l and h) and wages (wl and wh) for low- and high-skilled workers,
and output (y) are presented in Figure 1 (dashed line).13 As can be seen, consistent with
our theoretical results, an increase in life expectancy has a positive e¤ect on automation
capital, the wage and the employment level of high-skilled workers and the skill premium.
On the contrary, it has a negative e¤ect on the wage and the employment level of low-
skilled workers.
12Our results are also qualitatively robust to changes in  (see Subsection A.3 in the Appendix).
For high values of  the adjustment in the quantities and prices of labor are relatively small. In fact,
when  = 1; the two types of labor become perfect substitutes. In this case, the ratios of their marginal
products (wages) remain constant (= =1 ) and their levels of employment cease to respond to changes
in longevity.
13In Subsection A.4 we also present all the results in a tabular form both in levels and in percentage
changes.
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Figure 1: The e¤ects of longevity
dashed line: baseline model, no subsidy, solid line: a vacancy-maintenance subsidy nanced by
a robot tax  = 0:1.
As a consequence of the aforementioned e¤ects, there is an adverse change in the
distribution of income. More specically, based on the criteria of age and skill, there are
four income groups in this economy: young low-skilled, young high-skilled, old low-skilled
and old high-skilled. The income level of each group is a¤ected by the changes in wages
and the levels of employment. The change in the Gini coe¢cient, presented in Figure 1,
indicates that, as life expectancy increases, income inequality goes up.
Finally, the e¤ect of an increase in life expectancy on output is positive, meaning
that the e¤ects via traditional physical capital, automation capital and the employment
of high-skilled workers dominate on the e¤ect through the employment of low-skilled
workers. In Subsection A.2 of the Appendix , we also present the e¤ects on traditional
capital (k) and the tightness in each labor market (i). Quantitatively, the e¤ects range
from small (on wages and employment levels) to modest (on the skill premium and the
Gini coe¢cient) to substantial (on output and automation capital).
4.3 A Vacancy-maintenance Subsidy
In this subsection, we consider a redistributive policy towards low-skilled workers. More
specically, the government provides to rms a subsidy for maintaining low-skilled vacan-
cies and nances this subsidy with a robot tax, i.e., a tax on the use of automation
14
capital (see Gasteiger and Prettner 2020).14 As a result, the prot of the representative
rm becomes:









where  is the rate of the robot tax and t is the subsidy for maintaining a vacancy of
type l. The rst-order conditions with respect to pt and v
l
t are







t = dl   t: (23)
Setting equations (9) and (22) equal to each other, we solve for kt
kt = (1 + )
 
1   
 (lt + pt)
 + (1  )ht
(lt + pt) 1
:













Acemoglu et al. (2020) nd that the tax rate on equipment and software capital
is around 10%. The same number is used by Guerreiro et al. (2021). Thus, we set
 = 10% and we let the government budget constraint (24) determine the subsidy t:
15
The resulting subsidy is presented in Subsection A.2 and in Table A.5 (Subsection A.4).
As a percentage of the cost of maintaining a low-skilled vacancy, the subsidy ranges from
0.4% (when  = 0:6) to 4.0% (when  = 0:9):16
The results appear in Figure 1 (solid line). The subsidy lowers the cost of maintaining
a low-skilled vacancy, spurs rms to open more low-skilled vacancies and increases the
market tightness for low-skilled workers. At the same time, the robot tax discourages the
14A robot tax is often suggested as a way to mitigate the negative e¤ects of automation (see Gasteiger
and Prettner 2020 and Prettner and Bloom 2020 for details).
15As shown in Subsection A.5.1, our results are robust with respect to changes in  :
16In Subsection A.6, we consider the case where a vacancy-maintenance subsidy at a constant rate is
nanced by a constant robot tax and additional lump-sum taxation. The results are qualitatively the
same.
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accumulation of automation capital. If the subsidy is combined with the robot tax then,
for any given ; automation capital, the skill premium and the Gini coe¢cient decrease.
On the contrary, traditional capital, the wages and the quantities employed of both types
of labor as well as total output increase.
As the policy of a maintenance subsidy in combination with a robot tax continues and
longevity increases, the behavior of all the variables follows the same pattern as before,
starting either from higher or lower value, except for that of low-skilled labor employed.
The measure of employed low-skilled workers increases with the policy and continues to
do so as  rises. Thus, the trend of a high rate of technological unemployment for low-
skilled workers is not only mitigated, but reversed. The reason behind this result is that
the subsidy that follows from equation (24) is rising with ; as a given robot tax rate
is applied on a higher stock of automation capital. Regarding the skill premium, notice
in Figure 1 that when the subsidy is applied the skill premium drops instantaneously
because of the increase in market tightness l and the concomitant increase in the wage
rate for low-skilled labor. As then  increases and the subsidy remains, the skill premium
starts rising as before and eventually, for high values of longevity and hence high values
of tightness in the market for low-skilled labor, it surpasses the one without the subsidy.
Thus, there is a value of  below (above) which the skill premium with the subsidy is
below (above) the one without the subsidy. Finally, the Gini coe¢cient in the presence
of the subsidy remains far below the one without the subsidy.17
5 Extensions of the Baseline Model
Next, we consider two extensions of the basic model: (a) the existence of di¤erent survival
probabilities between the two skill groups and (b) the presence of endogenous participation
decision in tertiary education.
5.1 Di¤erential Survival Probability
Recent empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive association between longevity
and education. For instance, Sasson and Hayward (2019) nd that the estimated life
expectancy at age 25 years in the US between 2010 and 2017 declined among persons
without a Bachelors degree and increased among college-educated persons. They at-
tribute these ndings to the unhealthy lifestyle followed by people with lower educational
17As mentioned by Gasteiger and Prettner (2020), in an open-economy world, the success of a robot
tax requires its coordinated implementation in many countries to avoid the reallocation of capital to
jurisdictions that do not impose such a tax.
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background.18 We therefore extend our model to allow for di¤erent survival probabilities
between the two skill groups. In particular, we let i 2 [0; 1] denote the probability that
a young agent with skill i survives to maturity.
Each households i behavior follows now from the maximization of
U it = log c
i
y;t + i log c
i
o;t+1;















In this subsection, we perform a simulation exercise regarding the e¤ects of an increase
in either l or h. There are now 15 parameter values; the previous 13 and the two
probabilities of survival to the old age, l and h: For the parameters f; ; ;  ; nh; ; g,
we use the same values as in the baseline model. Following Sasson and Hayward (2019),
we set l = 0:57 and h = 0:82, so that the life expectancies obtained are consistent with
the data (77:1 years for unskilled labor and 84:6 for skilled labor). Finally, the remaining
6 parameters f;A; h; l; dh; dlg are recalibrated to match the above-mentioned 6 targets
obtained from the US data. The calibrated parameter values are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Values of the Calibrated Parameters
Value Interpretation
 = 0:427 Labor income share parameter
A = 6:180 Production e¢ciency parameter
l = 1:203, h = 1:240 Matching e¢ciency parameters
dl = 0:882, dh = 1:791 Vacancy costs
The results, presented in Figure 2, indicate that an increase in either l or h has always
a positive e¤ect on high-skilled labor and a negative e¤ect on low-skilled labor. The e¤ect
18This is not the rst time that we observe a decrease in the life expectancy of certain groups. For
example, the average life expectancy among American women without a high school diploma declined
from 78.5 years in 1990 to 73.5 years in 2008 (Olshansky et al. 2012).
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on output is also positive.19 The intuition is the same as the one described before when the
survival probability was the same between the two skill groups. The interesting nding
is that the welfare of the low-skilled group declines even as their prospects for survival
to the old age improve. Furthermore, the only di¤erence in the e¤ects resulting from a
change in the two survival probabilities is with respect to the Gini coe¢cient for income
distribution. As seen in Figure 2 (solid line), an increase in the survival probability of the
low-skilled workers raises income inequality, since more agents are in the second lowest
income group.20 On the other hand, an increase in the survival probability of the high-
skilled workers lowers income inequality, since more agents are in the highest income group
(dashed line).
















































































Figure 2: Di¤erential survival probability
dashed line: the e¤ects of an increase in h, solid line: the e¤ects of an increase in l.
5.2 Endogenous Investment in Tertiary Education
As we have shown in the previous sections, an increase in life expectancy has positive
e¤ects on high-skilled and negative e¤ects on low-skilled households. Therefore, one may
expect that more households are willing to invest in education. In this subsection, we
pursue this extension and allow for endogenous education decision.
19In addition, automation capital and traditional physical capital increase as either h or l goes up
(see Subsection A.2 in the Appendix).
20Note that the income of the old high-skilled is the highest among the four groups, followed by the
income of the young high-skilled, then by the income of the old low-skilled and nally by the income of
the young low-skilled.
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Following Prettner and Strulik (2020), we assume that each households i utility is
now given by:
U it = log c
i
y;t +  log c
i
o;t+1   1[i=h]v (a) ; (25)
where 1[i=h] denotes an indicator function that takes the value 1 if i = h and zero otherwise;
i.e., it takes the value 1 for individuals that obtain a Bachelors degree. Moreover, agents
are assumed to be heterogeneous in ability, a; and more able individuals need to spend less
e¤ort on obtaining a university degree: v0(a) < 0: The last term then in (25) captures the
disutility from the e¤ort that is required to obtain a university degree. As in Prettner and





for a  amin and v (a) = 1 otherwise (individuals with an ability level below amin must
spend innite e¤ort). The positive parameters  and  are used below to calibrate the







t (1  i) + T
i
t ;
where i is the constant investment of time spent on education; hence, i = 0 for i = l
(no college degree) and i = ; for i = h (college degree), where 0 <  < 1. Also,
T it > 0; if i = h and T
i
t = 0 if i = l; hence, T
i
t is a transfer/subsidy towards those that




















Substituting (26) and (27) in equation (25), we obtain the indirect utility function for
any given education decision. Household members compare the utility levels with and
without a college degree and choose to invest in higher education if












Substituting the e¤ort function v (a), we solve (28) with equality to obtain the thresh-














If we let F (a) denote the cumulative distribution function of ability, then the share of high-
19
skilled households nh;t = 1   F (a

t ). Note that, ceteris paribus, a higher life expectancy
strengthens individuals incentives to pursue a college degree and hence nh;t increases.






We rst calibrate the model assuming away any tax or subsidy. We then introduce
an education subsidy that is nanced by a robot tax and study the e¤ects on output,
employment and distribution. In this version of the model, there are 17 parameter values
to be determined; the previous 13, that is, the 14 parameters that are present in the
baseline model except for nh, which now becomes an endogenous variable; the time spent
on education ; and the parameters of the e¤ort function , , and amin. For the parameters
f; ; ;  ; ; ; g, we use the same values as in the baseline model. Following Prettner
and Strulik (2020), we set the time spent on education  = 0:11 and the ability level amin =
100;moreover, we assume that ability follows a normal distribution with a mean of 100 and
a standard deviation of 15.21 Finally, the remaining 8 parameters f;A; h; l; dh; dl; ; g
are recalibrated to match the above-mentioned 6 targets as well as two additional targets
obtained from the US data: the percentage of individuals with at least a Bachelors degree,
which is 32:3%, and the elasticity of college attendance with respect to its price, which is
1:5 (Dynarski, 2003). The calibrated parameter values are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Values of the Calibrated Parameters
Value Interpretation
 = 0:441 Labor income share parameter
A = 6:809 Production e¢ciency parameter
l = 1:203, h = 1:240 Matching e¢ciency parameters
dl = 0:980, dh = 1:990 Vacancy costs
 = 0:452,  = 39 Ability function parameters
21As explained in detail in Prettner and Strulik (2020), these numbers are based on the empirical
approximation of the ability distribution with the IQ distribution.
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Figure 3: The e¤ects of an education subsidy
dashed line: baseline model, no subsidy, solid line: an education subsidy nanced by a robot
tax  = 0:1.
The results, shown in Figure 3 (dashed line), indicate that when education investment
is endogenized, an increase in life expectancy raises the number of high-skilled households.
Due to this change, an increase in life expectancy still has positive e¤ects on automation
capital, the employment and the wage of high-skilled workers and output (the results
on automation capital, traditional physical capital and market tightness in the two labor
markets are presented in Appendix A.2). As for the low-skilled workers, their employment
and their wage decrease. Consequently, the skill premium increases. Finally, given the
above changes in the wages and the employment levels of the two skill groups as well as
the changes in the relative frequencies, the distribution of income gets better, while at
the same time the position of those who remain low-skilled worsens in both absolute and
in relative terms.
Next, based on the work of Acemoglu et al. (2020) and Guerreiro et al. (2021)
mentioned above in the case of the maintenance subsidy, we introduce a tax on robots at
the rate  = 0:1 and let the government budget constraint (29) determine the education
subsidy T ht :
22 The resulting subsidy is presented in Subsection A.2 and in Table A.9
(Subsection A.4). As a percentage of the labor income of high-skilled household, the
subsidy ranges from 0.5% (when  = 0:6) to 4.8% (when  = 0:9):23
22As shown in Subsection A.5.2, our results are robust with respect to changes in  :
23In Subsection A.6, we consider the case where an education subsidy at a constant rate is nanced by
a constant robot tax and additional lump-sum taxation. The results are qualitatively the same.
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The e¤ects of longevity in the presence of the redistributive policy are again shown
in Figure 3 (solid line). For any given level of longevity, the robot tax lowers the level
of automated capital and raises the level of traditional capital. On the other hand, the
education subsidy induces, ceteris paribus, individuals to invest in education. These ad-
justments have countervailing e¤ects on the wages and employment levels. The immediate
(i.e., for a given ) decrease in automation capital and the increase in traditional capital
drive the initial increase in the wage of the low-skilled workers and the decrease in the
number of educated high-skilled workers in comparison with the situation before the pol-
icy is instigated. Nevertheless, as the education subsidy and the robot tax continue to be
applied and longevity increases, the number of high-skilled workers increases and the level
of automation capital starts rising again (see Appendix A.2). Among the most notable
changes then in the e¤ects of longevity, in the presence of the redistributive policy, are
that the wages of low- and high-skilled workers are stabilized at higher levels. At the
same time, the skill premium and the Gini coe¢cient jump to a lower level and remain
essentially insensitive to changes in longevity. Thus, as before, the redistributive policy
that we analyzed in this subsection mitigates some of the negative e¤ects that follow from
an increase in life expectancy.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the e¤ects of an increase in life expectancy or, equivalently, longevity,
on output, employment and income distribution in the presence of automation as well as
traditional capital. We have shown that an increase in life expectancy raises the level of
automation capital, the employment and the wage of high-skilled labor, as well as the
skill premium. On the other hand, it lowers the employment and the wage of low-skilled
labor. Finally, it has an ambiguous e¤ect on output. When calibrating the model to the
US data, our simulation analysis shows that output goes up, but the distribution of in-
come deteriorates. Thus, changes in life expectancy have signicant distributional e¤ects.
Most of these results remain qualitatively the same when we extend the model to allow
for di¤erent mortality rates between low- and high-skilled workers or for an endogenous
education decision. We have also examined the e¤ects of redistributive policies, such as a
subsidy towards the maintenance of low-skilled vacancies or education that is nanced by
a robot tax, and have shown that such policies can alleviate some of the negative e¤ects
of increased life expectancy and automation capital.
Our analysis is subject to several qualications that call for further research. For
the sake of brevity we outline just two of them. First, in our analysis, the increase in
22
life expectancy occurs as a parametric shift and is not related to any medical R&D that
occurs in the economy. It is likely, however, that advances in both articial intelligence
and in longevity medicine are the results of systematic research e¤orts. To study then
more deeply the interplay between digital health technologies and automation, one would
have to introduce an R&D sector, as in Prettner and Strulik (2020), where new discoveries
a¤ect both the production and the healthcare sectors.
Another caveat of our model is that changes in longevity as well as in automation
do not inuence the length of agents working life. It will be an interesting extension
to endogenize the retirement age in the presence of automation. In fact, in the current
framework, changes in longevity and in automation will result in di¤erent retirement age
for each skill group. This is an additional dimension that will inuence not only the
distribution of income but also the sustainability of the public pension system. We leave
these, and other extensions, for future work.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1






+ ln  + ln (yll + yhh)  ln (p+ k) = 0; (A.1)
ln(1  ) + ln yl   ln dl + lnl   (1  ) ln 
l = 0; (A.2)
ln(1  ) + ln yh   ln dh + lnh   (1  ) ln 
h = 0: (A.3)
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=   (1  ) [1  (1   ) (1  
l)] < 0:
From equation (13), we have


















=  (1  
l) > 0; if  > 0:
Given by equations (14) and (15), we have
ln l = lnl +  ln 
l + lnnl;










The determinant of the Jacobian is
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(1  ) [(1  ) (1   ) (1  
l) + 
l]
< 0; if  > 0:
To analyze the e¤ects of increased longevity on automation capital, we replace the rst
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To analyze the e¤ects of longevity on low-skilled labor market tightness, we substitute
the second column of the Jacobian by the partial derivatives of equations (A.1)-(A.3) with












































To analyze the e¤ects of longevity on the tightness of high-skilled labor market, we
replace the third column of the Jacobian by the partial derivatives of equations (A.1)-(A.3)




































































































































































































































In this subsection, we present the e¤ects of longevity on traditional and automation
capital, the market tightness for low- and high- skilled workers and the resulting subsidy.
5






















Figure A1: The e¤ects of longevity
dashed line: baseline model, no subsidy, solid line: a vacancy-maintenance subsidy nanced by
a robot tax  = 0:1.
Vacancy-maintenance subsidy as a proportion of the cost of maintaining a low-skilled
vacancy:












Figure A2: Size of vacancy-maintenance subsidy























Figure A3: Di¤erential survival probability
dashed line: the e¤ects of an increase in h, solid line: the e¤ects of an increase in l.



























Figure A4: The e¤ects of an education subsidy
dashed line: baseline model, no subsidy, solid line: an education subsidy nanced by a robot
tax  = 0:1.
Education subsidy as a proportion of the labor income of a high-skilled household.





















Figure A5: Size of education subsidy
an education subsidy nanced by a robot tax  = 0:1.
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A.3 Sensitivity Analysis with respect to 
In this subsection, we check whether our results are robust with respect to changes in the
elasticity of substitution between low- and high-skilled workers. Recall that the elasticity
of substitution is equal to 1=(1   ): Indeed, if low- and high-skilled labor are gross
substitutes for each other, i.e.,  > 0, an increase in longevity has a positive e¤ect on
the steady-state levels of traditional and automation capital, the employment and wages
of high-skilled workers, output, the skill premium and the Gini coe¢cient. On the other
hand, it has a negative e¤ect on the employment and wages of low-skilled workers.
Table A.1:  = 0:1
 0.600 0.700 0.800 0.900
p 0.004 0.019 0.034 0.048
k 0.198 0.210 0.221 0.232
l 0.599 0.591 0.584 0.577
wl 0.596 0.588 0.581 0.575
h 0.340 0.348 0.354 0.361
wh 1.356 1.385 1.412 1.438
y 1.058 1.124 1.188 1.250
skill premium 2.273 2.355 2.431 2.502
Gini coe¢cient 0.240 0.258 0.273 0.287
Table A.2:  = 0:5
 0.600 0.700 0.800 0.900
p 0.013 0.029 0.044 0.058
k 0.186 0.195 0.205 0.213
l 0.641 0.636 0.632 0.628
wl 0.638 0.633 0.629 0.625
h 0.315 0.320 0.325 0.329
wh 1.257 1.277 1.294 1.311
y 2.794 2.904 3.007 3.104
skill premium 1.970 2.016 2.058 2.096
Gini coe¢cient 0.169 0.181 0.191 0.200
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Table A.3:  = 0:9
 0.600 0.700 0.800 0.900
p 0.025 0.041 0.057 0.071
k 0.186 0.195 0.205 0.213
l 0.714 0.713 0.712 0.711
wl 0.710 0.709 0.708 0.708
h 0.267 0.268 0.269 0.270
wh 1.062 1.067 1.071 1.074
y 3.141 3.247 3.345 3.436
skill premium 1.496 1.504 1.511 1.518
Gini coe¢cient 0.035 0.038 0.040 0.042
A.4 Tabular Presentation of the Results
This Subsection reports the results presented in the main text (Figures 1, 2 and 3) in a
tabular form. Related to Figure 1:
Table A.4: The e¤ects of longevity
Values Percentage Changes
 0.600 0.700 0.800 0.900 0.700 0.800 0.900
p 0.013 0.029 0.044 0.058 124.9 242.5 353.3
l 0.641 0.636 0.632 0.628 -0.764 -1.433 -2.026
wl 0.638 0.633 0.629 0.625 -0.764 -1.433 -2.026
h 0.315 0.320 0.325 0.329 1.553 2.969 4.266
wh 1.257 1.277 1.295 1.311 1.553 2.969 4.266
y 2.372 2.476 2.573 2.665 4.388 8.500 12.36
skill premium 1.970 2.016 2.058 2.097 2.335 4.466 6.421
Gini coe¢cient 0.225 0.231 0.235 0.239 2.666 4.727 6.361
k 0.186 0.195 0.205 0.213 5.192 10.08 14.68
l 0.620 0.611 0.602 0.595 -1.522 -2.846 -4.010
h 0.620 0.639 0.657 0.674 3.130 6.025 8.713
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Table A.5: The e¤ects of longevity in the presence of a vacancy-maintenance
subsidy
Values Percentage Changes
 0.600 0.700 0.800 0.900 0.700 0.800 0.900
p 0.005 0.021 0.037 0.051 337.0 660.2 969.2
l 0.665 0.667 0.670 0.673 0.387 0.818 1.263
wl 0.659 0.653 0.648 0.643 -0.905 -1.703 -2.407
h 0.322 0.328 0.333 0.338 1.829 3.519 5.075
wh 1.284 1.308 1.330 1.350 1.832 3.522 5.078
y 2.461 2.589 2.710 2.826 5.183 10.13 14.81
skill premium 1.949 2.002 2.052 2.098 2.762 5.315 7.669
Gini coe¢cient 0.211 0.215 0.219 0.221 2.236 3.861 5.055
k 0.205 0.218 0.230 0.242 6.144 12.03 17.64
l 0.667 0.672 0.678 0.684 0.775 1.643 2.541
h 0.647 0.671 0.693 0.714 3.692 7.162 10.41

dl
0.004 0.017 0.029 0.040 329.7 635.2 917.6
Related to Figure 2:
Table A.6: The e¤ects of l
Values Percentage Changes
l 0.570 0.700 0.800 0.900 0.700 0.800 0.900
p 0.013 0.023 0.029 0.036 76.18 128.9 177.2
l 0.641 0.638 0.636 0.634 -0.473 -0.787 -1.067
wl 0.577 0.575 0.573 0.571 -0.473 -0.787 -1.067
h 0.315 0.318 0.320 0.322 0.953 1.602 2.188
wh 1.138 1.148 1.156 1.162 0.953 1.602 2.188
y 2.146 2.203 2.243 2.279 2.678 4.527 6.220
skill premium 1.970 1.998 2.017 2.035 1.433 2.408 3.291
Gini coe¢cient 0.207 0.211 0.213 0.216 1.764 2.960 4.041
k 0.186 0.192 0.196 0.199 3.166 5.357 7.366
l 0.620 0.614 0.610 0.607 -0.943 -1.568 -2.123
h 0.620 0.632 0.640 0.647 1.916 3.229 4.424
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Table A.7: The e¤ects of h
Values Percentage Changes
h 0.820 0.880 0.940 1.000 0.880 0.940 1.000
p 0.013 0.017 0.020 0.024 29.28 57.71 85.33
l 0.641 0.640 0.639 0.638 -0.184 -0.360 -0.528
wl 0.577 0.576 0.575 0.574 -0.184 -0.360 -0.528
h 0.315 0.316 0.318 0.319 0.369 0.724 1.066
wh 1.138 1.142 1.146 1.150 0.369 0.724 1.066
y 2.146 2.168 2.189 2.210 1.030 2.030 3.000
skill premium 1.970 1.981 1.991 2.002 0.554 1.088 1.603
Gini coe¢cient 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.206 -0.045 -0.289 -0.707
k 0.186 0.188 0.190 0.192 1.217 2.398 3.546
l 0.620 0.618 0.616 0.613 -0.368 -0.719 -1.053
h 0.620 0.625 0.629 0.633 0.739 1.453 2.144
Related to Figure 3:
Table A.8: The e¤ects of longevity
Values Percentage Changes
 0.600 0.700 0.800 0.900 0.700 0.800 0.900
nh 0.323 0.337 0.350 0.362 4.334 8.377 12.15
l 0.641 0.627 0.614 0.603 -2.150 -4.154 -6.021
wl 0.642 0.641 0.641 0.640 -0.084 -0.164 -0.239
h 0.281 0.293 0.305 0.316 4.527 8.766 12.74
wh 1.264 1.266 1.268 1.271 0.185 0.359 0.526
y 2.259 2.369 2.473 2.571 4.876 9.471 13.81
skill premium 1.970 1.975 1.980 1.985 0.270 0.523 0.767
Gini coe¢cient 0.197 0.196 0.193 0.190 -0.979 -2.248 -3.664
p 0.013 0.029 0.044 0.058 125.8 244.3 356.0
k 0.176 0.185 0.193 0.201 4.964 9.650 14.08
l 0.620 0.619 0.618 0.617 -0.169 -0.327 -0.478
h 0.620 0.622 0.624 0.627 0.370 0.719 1.055
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Table A.9: The e¤ects of longevity in the presence of an education subsidy
Values Percentage Changes
 0.600 0.700 0.800 0.900 0.700 0.800 0.900
nh 0.319 0.338 0.354 0.370 4.334 8.377 12.15
l 0.664 0.647 0.631 0.616 -2.618 -5.065 -7.345
wl 0.661 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.037 0.045 0.028
h 0.284 0.300 0.315 0.329 5.568 10.77 15.63
wh 1.295 1.294 1.294 1.294 -0.081 -0.098 -0.061
y 2.338 2.464 2.585 2.700 5.414 10.58 15.50
skill premium 1.958 1.956 1.955 1.956 -0.118 -0.143 -0.089
Gini coe¢cient 0.187 0.188 0.188 0.187 0.371 0.351 0.093
p 0.005 0.023 0.040 0.057 339.0 663.0 972.8
k 0.194 0.205 0.215 0.224 5.375 10.53 15.47
l 0.659 0.660 0.660 0.659 0.075 0.090 0.056
h 0.651 0.650 0.650 0.650 -0.162 -0.196 -0.122
Th
wheh(1 )
0.005 0.021 0.036 0.048 316.3 589.8 828.6
A.5 Sensitivity Analysis with respect to 
A.5.1 Maintenance Subsidy
In Subsection 4.3, to ensure that the amount of automation capital is positive, the rate
of robot tax  cannot exceed 0:15. Figure A6 presents the results for  = 0:07; 0:1 and
0:13: As can be seen below, the results are robust with respect to changes in the value of
 :
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Figure A6: The e¤ects of longevity
A.5.2 Education Subsidy
In Section 5.2, to ensure that the amount of automation capital is positive, the rate of
robot tax  cannot exceed 0:16. Figure A7 presents the results for  = 0:07; 0:1 and 0:13:
As can be seen below, the results are robust with respect to changes in the value of  :
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Figure A7: The e¤ects of education subsidy
A.6 Lump-sum Taxation
In this subsection, we consider the case where the two subsidies, i.e., the maintenance
subsidy and the education subsidy, are nanced by a robot tax and an additional lump-
sum taxation.
A.6.1 Vacancy-maintenance subsidy
We assume a constant vacancy-maintenance subsidy  = 0:01dl nanced by a proportional
robot tax  = 0:1 and an additional lump-sum taxation Tt. The prot of the representative
rm becomes









The government budget constraint becomes
14
Rp;tpt + Tt = v
l
t:
Figure A8 presents the results.
































































































Figure A8: The e¤ects of a constant vacancy-maintenance subsidy
dashed line: baseline model, no subsidy, solid line: a vacancy-maintenance subsidy  = 0:01dl
nanced by a robot tax  = 0:1 and a lump-sum tax Tt.
A.6.2 Education Subsidy
We assume a constant education subsidy T h = 0:05 nanced by a proportional robot tax
 = 0:1 and an additional lump-sum tax Tt. The prot of the representative rm becomes









The government budget constraint becomes
Rp;tpt + Tt = nh;tT
h:
15
Figure A9 presents the results.









































































































Figure A9: The e¤ects of a constant education subsidy
dashed line: baseline model, no subsidy, solid line: a education subsidy T h= 0:05 nanced by
a robot tax  = 0:1 and a lump-sum tax Tt.
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